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EVOLVING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
STANDARDS FOR HEALTHCARE
NONPROFITS: IS BOARD OF DIRECTOR
COMPENSATION A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY
DUTY?
Mark S. Blodgett,* Linda J. Melconian,** and Jason H. Peterson***
This Article reviews the historic, ethical, and legal foundations of
fiduciary duty and nonprofit corporate governance. It then addresses the
current nonprofit healthcare governance issue of Board compensation. The
data collected contrasts the amounts of nonprofit healthcare and for-profit
healthcare compensation. This Article argues that nonprofit Board
compensation may breach fiduciary duty and compromise public policy.
The authors conclude that concerns about nonprofit Board compensation
are warranted and propose legislative reform.
Ought the executive department of a great voluntary society, for missions
or for any similar enterprise, to be really and formally responsible to
anybody? . . .
....
A true responsibility of the executive to some superior or constituent
power is a security against mismanagement and the gradual perversion of
the trust . . . . Great perversions of trust[] . . . occur. . . for the most part
unconsciously, gradually, and with best intentions.1
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their assistance with the research and preparation of this Article.
1. Leonard Bacon, Responsibility in the Management of Societies, 5 THE NEW ENGLANDER
28, 29, 32, 33 (1847). Yale professor, Leonard Bacon, studied nonprofit governance and published
an article on fiduciary accountability to the public. Id. He asserted that Board members, as
fiduciaries, are accountable to a higher power of morality and that they must disclose their
activities. Id. This fiduciary responsibility was thus also an individual responsibility as the
manager of others’ property. Id. This high standard of fiduciary accountability was necessary to
prevent public hostility. Id.
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INTRODUCTION
Nonprofit organizations exist everywhere in American society.2 These
voluntary associations comprise nearly 10 percent of the U.S. economy and
consist of three major categories: health care, education, and human
services.3 Over time, nonprofit governance has evolved, reflecting
modifications and conflicts in the interpretation and application of the legal
and ethical doctrine of fiduciary duty.4 These changes have eroded the
uniqueness of nonprofit Board of Director (BOD or Board) leadership. In a
new era of nonprofit governance, the current permissive practice of
nonprofit Director compensation5 may vitiate volunteerism and breach
fiduciary duty.6 Today, numerous and similar occurrences of malfeasance
blur distinctions between nonprofit (e.g., United Way) and for-profit (e.g.,
Enron) governance.7 Breach of fiduciary duty has generally triggered
corporate wrongdoing; for nonprofits, it has betrayed the public trust.8
2. Alex de Tocqueville, the 19th century French observer of American society, wrote about
the uniqueness of democratic American institutions: “Americans of all ages, all stations in life,
and all types of dispositions . . . are forever forming associations.” 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 129 (ed. Francis Bowen, trans. Henry Reeve, Esq., Cambridge: Sever
& Francis 1863) (1840). He asserted that such voluntary associations were necessary for a stable
democracy where “all citizens are equally independent and cannot rely on a powerful central
government to dictate values or dispense charity.” Id.; see also AMY S. BLACKWOOD ET AL.,
URBAN INST., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF: PUBLIC CHARITIES, GIVING, AND
VOLUNTEERING, 2012, at 2 tbl.1 (2012).
3. See William Byrnes, A Short History of the Nonprofit Sector, CALIFORNIA ASS’N OF
NONPROFITS, http://web.archive.org/web/20100813084043/http:/www.canonprofits.org/index.php
?option=com_content&view=article&id=254&Itemid=107 (last visited June 10, 2013); Karla
Taylor, Changing Expectations for Nonprofit Governance, 57 ASS’N MGMT 64, 64 (2005). The
three major nonprofit categories listed above break down as follows: education (18.1 percent);
health (13.2 percent); and human services (33.7 percent). PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR,
STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATIONS: A FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 11 (2005)
[hereinafter STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY]. For example, health care nonprofits include 60
percent of community hospitals, all community health centers, nearly 30 percent of nursing
homes, approximately 17 percent of home health care agencies, and 40 percent of all private
health insurance enrollees. See Byrnes, supra.
4. See REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (1987) (amended 2008).
5. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3351(c), 3363.6(c) (2010).
6. See infra notes 72 and 106 and accompanying text; see also REV. MODEL NONPROFIT
CORP. ACT; An Act Regulating Compensation of Board Members of Public Charities: Hearing on
H. 3516 Before the J. Comm’n on the Judiciary, 187th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2011) [hereinafter
Peregrine Testimony] (testimony from Michael W. Peregrine, Esq., on behalf of Tufts Health
Plan).
7. See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime
After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 357, 357–69 (2003) (discussing the Enron scandal);
Karen Donnelly, Comment, Good Governance: Has the IRS Usurped the Business Judgment of
Tax-Exempt Organizations in the Name of Transparency and Accountability?, 79 UMKC L. REV.
163, 173–74 (2010) (discussing scandals in the independent sector, including United Way,
American Red Cross, Nature Conservancy, and American University); Christyne J. Vachon,
Blurring. Not Fading. Looking at the Duties of Care and Loyalty as Nonprofits Move into
Commercialism, 12 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 37, 42–43 (2011) (discussing how
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Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in an attempt to regulate
fiduciary breaches within for-profit organizations; yet for nonprofits, it has
thus far merely initiated a nonprofit dialogue with a review and
recommendations in two major reports.9 The result of these efforts has
focused much attention on nonprofit Board accountability, disclosure, and
transparency that includes more specific issues of nonprofit ethical
responsibility, fiduciary duty, internal financial controls, fraud, and
excessive executive compensation.10 It appears that Congress has generally
left nonprofit regulation to the states, and the states are beginning to
respond.11 However, while states may pass statutes to address nonprofit best
governance practices and reform, these laws may also contribute to a further
blurring of the nonprofit distinction by permitting “reasonable” BOD
compensation.12 Such permissive practice of Board compensation erodes
the public trust.13
Public trust underscores the historic uniqueness of “a great voluntary
society,” and our ubiquitous nonprofit organizations.14 Yet it also
emphasizes the responsibility with which they are managed.15 These
voluntary associations exist pursuant to the U.S. Constitution’s First
Amendment Right to Assemble, a hallmark of American democracy.16
Moreover, they self-govern free from state legislative control and for the
public benefit.17 Thus, the nonprofit governance standard derives from the

nonprofits and for-profit businesses are becoming similar with regard to corporate governance and
corporate malfeasance).
8. See Bacon, supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also Mark S. Blodgett and Linda J.
Melconian, Health-care Nonprofits: Enhancing Governance and Public Trust, BUSINESS AND
SOCIETY REVIEW 117:2, 197–219 (2012).
9. See infra note 138. Both reports to Congress show not only the urgency of nonprofit
issues, but also the lack of congressional action and oversight. Id.
10. Board compensation is the major distinguishing factor within the two reports. It appears in
the 2007 report but not 2005. See infra note 138.
11. See infra notes 114 and 104. Among the states, at least Massachusetts and New York
appear to be considering ethical reforms. See id.; see also infra note 114. The Massachusetts
AG’s Office has also noted that “compensating Directors is contrary to [a charitable] spirit and
diverts resources otherwise focused on achieving the charitable mission of the organization.” See
infra note 24, at 3.
12. See infra note 103.
13. Rachel Penski, Note, The Case of CEO Richard Grasso and the NYSE: Proposals for
Controlling Executive Compensation at Public Nonprofit Corporations, 58 VAND. L. REV. 339,
340 (2005) (discussing public outcry over the NYSE’s CEO’s excessive compensation package).
14. See Bacon, supra note 1, at 29.
15. See id., at 29–30.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances.” Id.
17. This process began with the founding of Harvard College (Hall) and culminated in
Dartmouth v. Woodwood. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 661 (1819).
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application of the highest morality as a “security against mismanagement”
first enunciated by Yale scholar Leonard Bacon in 1831.18
This Article reviews the governance of nonprofits as it evolved through
our constitutional guarantees and case law.19 It then examines the changing
governance standards of fiduciary duty in comparison to for-profit
organizations, the more recent emphasis on the fiduciary duty of obedience,
and the status of current state regulatory reforms and legislative proposals.20
Investigation of nonprofit BOD compensation as outlined in Appendix A
reveals that, within the three major categories of nonprofit organizations, a
number of healthcare nonprofits are currently compensating their Board
members at modest levels compared to their for-profit counterparts.
Part A of the analysis argues that nonprofit healthcare BOD
compensation may be a breach of fiduciary duty.21 In particular, the
Massachusetts legislative initiative for regulating Board compensation is
perhaps to be expected since that State has been in the forefront of the
historical evolution of U.S. state nonprofit governance.22 Part B of the
analysis argues that BOD compensation is inefficient and unwarranted
within the nonprofit healthcare industry.23 In Part C, this Article concludes
by noting that the blurring of nonprofit and for-profit governance may
violate historical and ethical principles of the nonprofit public benefit;
therefore, states should establish a presumption that prohibits nonprofit
Board compensation and that can be rebutted only with the most rigorous
justification as developed by the respective States’ Attorneys General
(AGs).24 The justification should include a measurable connection between
the charitable mission of the nonprofit and Board performance.

18.
19.
20.
21.

See Bacon, supra note 1, at 32.
See Byrnes, supra note 3.
See Appendix A: Healthcare Nonprofit Board Compensation, infra p. 31.
There is likely no intention to breach fiduciary duty, but rather a manifestation of Bacon’s
admonition about unconscious and gradual perversion of the public trust. See Bacon, supra note 1,
at 32–33; Peter D. Hall, A History of Nonprofit Boards in the United States, BOARDSOURCE 3
(2003), http://beech.ait.fredonia.edu/nfp/ReadingRoom/PDFs/BoardSource-AHistoryOfNonprofit
BoardsInTheUnitedStates.pdf (last visited June 10, 2013) (describing examples of nonprofits that
unconsciously and unintentionally breached their fiduciary duties).
22. See infra notes 113–124 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 172–188 and accompanying text.
24. See Letter from David G. Spackman, Chief of Non-Profit Org./Pub. Charities Div. Mass.
Att’y Gen., to Barry L. Shemin, Chair of Bd. of Dir., Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Davey Scoon,
Chair of Bd. of Dir., Tufts Health Plan, David W. Hillis, Chair of Bd. of Dir., Fallon Cmty. Health
Plan, and Paul Guzzi, Chair of Bd. of Dir., Blue Cross Blue Shield of MA (Apr. 14, 2011)
[hereinafter Spackman Letter], available at http://www.charitableplanning.com/cpc_18215171.pdf (creating a justification for such a presumption based on the compensation practices of the
nonprofits discovered by Massachusetts AG Coakley).
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BACKGROUND
A. COLONIAL AND STATE HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNANCE FOR THE
PUBLIC GOOD

The historic roots of U.S. nonprofits originated in Elizabethan
England.25 The British Parliament first granted the right to assemble to
healthcare and education organizations benefitting the public good.26 This
right to form associations also included a tax-exempt status.27 Many
colonial legislatures followed Parliament’s common law precedent as
nonprofits evolved into a distinctly American practice of institutional
governance.28 The Massachusetts Bay Company’s Charter, better known as
the Mayflower Compact, is an early colonial framework for nonprofit
charters and self-governance.29
The founding of Harvard College in colonial Cambridge, Massachusetts
triggered the evolution of American nonprofit governance with the
chartering of a corporation whose mission was the public good.30 Its charter,
like the Mayflower Compact, did not restrict the Board’s powers solely to a
grant of property; rather, it further delegated self-governance to the Board
and allowed for perpetual succession.31 While it set precedent for U.S.
nonprofit Board independence from government control, it further imposed
a duty on the Board to promote the good of both the institution and the
public.32 However, Harvard’s managerial autonomy needed further
clarification, which it attained with the advent of state rather than colonial
legislative and regulatory powers.33 Dartmouth v. Woodward would
25. See Byrnes, supra note 3. The 1597 Charitable Corporations Act exempted hospitals from
taxation and was soon followed by the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses, which expanded the scope
of tax exemption. Id. It included charities for “maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers, schools
of learning, free schools and scholars in universities.” Id. These Acts sidestepped traditional
inheritance law by allowing private and untaxed money to be transferred to the public benefit. Id.
This included real property that could be transferred to charitable trusts. See id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Hall, supra note 21, at 9–10.
29. Id. at 4; see also Carlton Waterhouse, Avoiding Another Step in a Series of Unfortunate
Legal Events: A Consideration of Black Life Under American Law From 1619 to 1972 and a
Challenge to Prevailing Notions of Legally Based Reparations, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 207,
231 n.126 (2006). (“Colonists in Massachusetts established the Mayflower compact and only two
colonies did not include self-governance provisions in their formation: New York and Georgia.”).
30. See Hall, supra note 21, at 5–6. The Massachusetts Colonial legislature established
Harvard College in 1636 by granting a formal charter of incorporation making Harvard
autonomous and separate from the legislature. Id. This autonomy included management of its
affairs. Id. Its government structure consisted of officers to manage the corporation and the board
of public overseers, local ministers, and magistrates, who could veto management decisions. Id.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 5, 18.
33. Id. at 5. Two views of nonprofit Board governance still prevail—the Jeffersonian view and
the Harvard or common law view. Id. at 9–10, 13. The first is subject to the control of state
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determine the scope of state authority over nonprofits and BOD
independence.34 In Dartmouth, the Marshall Court affirmatively established
the principle that private associations for public benefit are expressions of
our Constitutional Right to Assemble, free from the “influence of legislative
bodies, whose fluctuating policy, and repeated interferences, produced the
most perplexing and injurious embarrassments.”35 Though the Dartmouth
case appeared to reconcile the legal conflict of nonprofit governance, Board
accountability continued to vary among states.36 Of course, Massachusetts,
based on its early history of nonprofit charters, had adopted the commonlaw/Harvard model of nonprofit governance that was autonomous from the
State legislature.37
Massachusetts continued to take the early lead in shaping state
nonprofit governance.38 For example, the first standard of nonprofit
fiduciary duty was enunciated in 1830 in Harvard College v. Amory, in
which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court established the Prudent
Man Rule: “All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, . . . to observe
how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs .
. . .”39 It was a strict ethical standard expressly prohibiting any Board selfdealing, or conflict of interest, and it remained the standard for nearly 160
years for nonprofit organizations committed to public benefit.40
Additionally, nonprofit Board members served as volunteers, another

legislatures while the second is based upon the constitutional right to assemble and to guard the
public’s private rights. Id. at 10.
34. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 518 (1819). In 1817, New Hampshire
acquired Dartmouth College and instituted the Jeffersonian view of nonprofit governance by
replacing its Board with gubernatorial and legislative appointed overseers. See id. at 626.
35. Id. at 648. Congressman and Dartmouth alumnus Daniel Webster argued for the Harvard
or common law view and the peoples’ right to assemble with Boards serving to protect citizens’
private rights. See Hall, supra note 21, at 11–12.
36. See Hall, supra note 21, at 13. Virginia followed the Jeffersonian view of state control and
oversight. Id. at 10, 13. States like Pennsylvania continued to follow the Jeffersonian view by
applying a “charitableness test,” established in 1980, by which local authorities could balance tax
exemption benefits against the public benefit. Id. at 13. New York formed a Board of Regents in
1785 to oversee its nonprofit educational institutions, and in 1990, it replaced the self-dealing
trustees of Adelphi University. Id.
37. See id. at 10.
38. See generally Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446 (1830) (imposing on the trustees of
an estate—a nonprofit entity—the “prudent man” rule governing fiduciary duty).
39. Id. at 461. In Amory, a widow received a $50,000 estate that diminished to $30,000 at the
time of her death. Id. at 447. These monies were then claimed by Massachusetts General Hospital
and Harvard. Id. at 450. Both of these parties sued the estate alleging mismanagement. Id. The
court excused the trustees of mismanagement and diminution of the estate consistent with the
Prudent Man Investment Rule. Id. at 461, 465.
40. Id.; see also Lynn Foster, G.S. Brant Perkins & Renee Brida, Investments of Estate Assets,
4 ARK. PROBATE & ESTATE ADMIN. § 12:5 (2012) (beginning in the 1990s, the “prudent investor”
rule began to overtake the 1830s “prudent person rule”).
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uniquely distinctive feature of nonprofit organizations serving the public
good.41
B. BOARD MEMBER COMPENSATION
For-profit organizations have traditionally viewed Director
compensation as an important component of corporate governance within
the marketplace and generally consider two primary questions with regard
to compensation: does compensation motivate otherwise qualified
individuals to serve on corporate Boards and does compensation properly
align Directors with shareholders’ interests?42 Several additional factors
beyond compensation, however, can motivate Board service at for-profit
organizations. For example, Directors are often guided by an altruistic sense
that there is an inherent obligation to “do the right thing” for the firm.43
Also, so long as Directors feel that they have the expertise to contribute,
they will serve regardless of compensation.44 Moreover, the education that
Directors receive from serving on Boards and working with peers also plays
a strong role in motivating service.45 Finally, “reputation capital” plays an
important role.46 Directors who serve on the Boards of successful firms are
often afforded additional business opportunities and other personal
recognition beyond merely an intrinsic sense of accomplishment.47
Nonetheless, compensation does motivate Directors to serve at forprofit organizations.48 The proper form of compensation remains unsettled
largely because organizations struggle to maintain an independent Board
while simultaneously aligning shareholder and Director interests.49 For
example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires
extensive disclosure of BOD compensation to allow the market and

41. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5239 (2012); see also Robert W. Friz & Elizabeth Virgin,
The Sarbanes Oxley Act—Considerations for Nonprofit Health Care Organizations, 18 HEALTH
LAW, June 2006, at 1, 5 (“Nonprofit organizations have traditionally been governed by Boards of
Directors comprised of local unpaid volunteers.”).
42. See generally Katherine M. Brown, Note, New Demands, Better Boards: Rethinking
Director Compensation in an Era of Heightened Corporate Governance, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1102
(2007) (arguing that cash and equity should form the basis of Director compensation).
43. Id. at 1114 (comparing Directors to politicians).
44. Id. at 1114–15 (noting that “[t]he strongest incentive for directors to ‘do the right thing.’ . .
. is not so much independence as it is their expertise, diligence, and inherent curiosity” (quoting
Michael Barrier, The Compensation Balance, INTERNAL AUDITOR, June 2002, at 47)).
45. Id. at 1115 (noting one Director who commented that Board members should pay for their
service because of the education received).
46. Id. at 1116.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 1115–16. While perhaps not the driving force to serve, financial compensation may
impact the manner in which Directors serve. Id. at 1116. Compensation may further provide a
psychological link to the organization. See id.
49. See id. at 1117.
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shareholders to monitor and react to an organization’s policy.50
Shareholders react to whether or not Directors are fulfilling their agency
roles while the market monitors whether the firm is maximizing its value.51
Consequently, corporate Board compensation is efficiently captured within
the marketplace.
There are two primary means of compensating Directors and each one
has its shortcomings.52 First, firms may pay Directors directly in cash.53
This practice maintains the Board’s independence from shareholders and
managers and reduces conflicts of interest, as Directors are less likely to
consider the financial impact of their decisions on the company.54 Second,
firms often alternatively offer Directors equity either through direct shares
of stock or through stock options.55 Equity compensation theoretically
reduces agency costs as the interests of Directors are aligned with
shareholders.56 Those aligned interests, however, can result in too “cozy” of
a relationship that could lead to earnings management and other ethical
breaches.57 Additionally, a third alternative method of compensating
Directors ties compensation to performance.58 However, as Directors set
their own performance goals, potential conflicts of interest are readily
apparent.59 Further, the practice of Directors sharing identical performance
goals as managers or officers of the corporation reduces the independence
of the Board.60
Charitable volunteer associations throughout the colonial and early state
period generally did not compensate Board members, a traditional practice
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 1118.
Id. at 1121–26.
See id. at 1121–22.
Brown, supra note 42, at 1121–22. In a riskier marketplace, Directors often prefer the
security of cash compensation. Id.
55. Id. at 1122–23; see Tom Johansmeyer, Board of Directors are Doing More to Earn Their
Keep, DAILY FIN., (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2009/12/18/boards-of-directorsare-doing-more-to-earn-their-keep/.
56. See Brown, supra note 42, at 1124.
57. Caroline A. Antonacci, Note, SAB 99: Combating Earnings Management with a
Qualitative Standard of Materiality, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 75, 76 (2001). Earnings management
arises when “[e]xecutives, accountants, and auditors contribut[e] to the wide-spread use of
creative accounting gimmicks [that] are motivated by inflated earnings targets, judicial and
legislative pronouncements retracting accountants’ liability, and executive compensation plans
triggered by upward momentum in stock price.” Id.
58. Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based Compensation
Positively Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227, 228 n.3 (1999)
(“Although having a significant portion of an executive's pay take the form of contingent
compensation is a relatively recent phenomenon, pay for performance is not a new idea. Some say
that the philosophy of linking pay to performance dates back to the Protestant Reformation of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.”).
59. See Brown, supra note 42, at 1131.
60. Id.
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that prevailed well into the late twentieth century.61 In particular, health care
nonprofits have traditionally relied upon volunteer community and business
leaders to serve as Directors; yet, during the last twenty-five years, the
permissive practice of compensating Directors has ushered in a new era.62
The justification for this permissive practice largely stems from the
complex nature of the healthcare industry and the perceived competition for
qualified Directors.63 The mission of all healthcare organizations is to
finance and deliver healthcare services; however, the distinction between
for-profit and nonprofit healthcare organizations is less clear because both
offer similar services with an identical mission of caring for patients.64
Appendix A illustrates 2010 Director compensation data for the top ten
organizations by assets within four categories: all industry nonprofits, all
industry for-profits, healthcare nonprofits, and healthcare for-profits.65 In
the top ten nonprofit healthcare industry classification, seven out of ten
organizations compensated their Boards while only forty-one out of 229
individual Directors within that classification received compensation.
Furthermore, within the top ten healthcare nonprofits, the average salary
paid per Director who received compensation was $79,799, and $14,287 per
Director inclusive of Directors who received no compensation. In the all
industry nonprofit class, twenty-three out of 160 Directors received
compensation with an average of $147,276 paid per Director who received
compensation, and $12,170.90 per Director inclusive of Directors who
received no compensation. In comparison, for-profit healthcare Directors
received an average of $259,556 annually.
C. FIDUCIARY DUTY
A nonprofit Board’s fiduciary duties and ethical governance obligations
ultimately run to those segments of the public for whose benefit the
61. See supra notes 30 (founding of Harvard), 31 (describing the Mayflower compact), 34
(providing judicial clarification in the Dartmouth case), 38 (showing the changes brought about by
the Amory case) and accompanying text.
62. Compare Nicole Huberfeld, Tackling the “Evils” of Interlocking Directorates in
Healthcare Nonprofits, 85 NEB. L. REV. 681, 687 (2007) with REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP.
ACT § 8.12 (1987) (permitting nonprofit Director compensation).
63. Peregrine Testimony, supra note 6.
64. Id.
65. See Appendix A, infra pp. 28–32. Further, studies suggest that the healthcare nonprofit
industry operates more efficiently than the for-profit industry. See Steffie Woolhander & David U.
Himmelstein, When Money Is the Mission – The High Costs of Investor-Owned Care, 341 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 444, 445–46 (1999); Pauline V. Rosenau & Stephen H. Linder, Two Decades of
Research Comparing For-Profit and Nonprofit Health Provider Performance in the United States,
84 SOC. SCI. Q. 219, 219, 224 (2003). In the healthcare industry, the distinction between for-profit
organizations and their nonprofit counterparts is less clear because both offer similar services with
the identical mission of caring for patients. William C. Kellough, Affiliations, Sales, and
Conversion Involving Non-Profit and For-Profit Healthcare Organizations in Oklahoma, 33
TULSA L.J. 521, 522–23 (1997).

452

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 7

organization’s charitable purpose was created.66 Nonprofit Directors fulfill
these duties by governing with due care, loyalty, and obedience.67
Furthermore, the Board must execute its leadership role in a way that
strengthens the nonprofit mission and financial integrity throughout all
levels of the organization.68 The states’ power to police BOD fiduciary
responsibilities generally rests with the Office of the State AG, most often
through its public charities or consumer protection divisions.69 Hence, due
to this minimal oversight, the BOD’s responsibility to set the appropriate
fiduciary tone at the top of the nonprofit organization and to govern in a
manner that preserves the public trust are of paramount importance.70
Nonprofit BOD’s fiduciary duties support the public trust by placing
the public’s interest first and foremost.71 Unlike for-profit Directors,
nonprofit Directors’ fiduciary duty directly encompasses multiple
stakeholders’ interests rather than focusing on the narrower interests of
shareholders, since the nonprofit organization’s goal is not to maximize
profits for shareholders.72 Rather, the purpose of nonprofit BOD fiduciary
66. Lesley Rosenthal, Nonprofit Corporate Governance: The Board’s Role, THE HARVARD L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 15, 2012), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu
/corpgov/2012/04/15/nonprofit-corporate-governance-the-boards-role/#more-27827; see also
Tracy G. Landauer & Harry J. Friedman, How to Be a Responsible Nonprofit Director: Do’s and
Don’ts—Avoiding Punishment for Good Deeds, GREENBERG TRAURIG ALERT 1–4 (Nov. 2005),
http://www2.gtlaw.com/pub/alerts/2005/1102.pdf.
67. See Gary R. Pannone, Board Governance and the Non-Profit Organization, PANNONE
LOPES DEVEREAUX & WEST LLC, http://www.pldw.com/Knowledge-and-Resource-Center
/PLDW-Board-Governance.pdf (last visited April 21, 2013) (defining the duties, responsibilities
and management structure of the nonprofit board); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-6-22 (2012) (outlining the
duties of the board of directors); see also Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715
N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
68. See generally Pamela C. Smith, Kerry McTier & Kelly R. Pope, Nonprofit Employees’
Machiavellian Propensities, 25 FIN. ACCOUNTABILITY & MGMT 335 (2009) (arguing that
nonprofit organizations need to take steps at all levels in order to preserve its charitable mission,
specifically focusing on public information, fiscal control, management, disclosure, and the public
good).
69. See, e.g., The Non-Profit Organizations/Public Charities Division, ATT’Y GEN. OF MASS.,
http://www.mass.gov/ago/bureaus/business-and-labor/the-non-profit-organizations-publiccharities-division/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Public Charities]; Charities, ATT’Y
GEN. OF CAL., http://oag.ca.gov/charities (last visited Feb. 11, 2013); About the Charities Bureau,
ATT’Y GEN. OF N.Y., http://www.charitiesnys.com/about_new.jsp (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
70. See generally Mark S. Schwartz, Thomas W. Dunfee & Michael J. Kline, Tone at the Top:
An Ethics Code for Directors?, 58 J. BUS. ETHICS 79 (2005) (arguing that Directors play a critical
ethical role, requiring them to set the tone for their organization’s overall ethics and corporate
governance programs).
71. LARUE TONE HOSMER, THE ETHICS OF MANAGEMENT 116–17 (7th ed., McGraw-Hill
2011). A fiduciary is defined as “[a] person who is required to act for the benefit of another person
on all matters within the scope of their relationship.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 702 (9th ed.
2009).
72. Gary Kirk & Shabnam B. Nolan, Nonprofit Mission Statement Focus and Financial
Performance, 20 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 473, 477 (2010); see also Woolhander &
Himmelstein, supra note 65, at 446.
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duty is solely to fulfill the organization’s charitable mission—a stakeholderbased purpose to benefit the public.73
Potentially weakening the connection between nonprofit BOD
governance policy and the public benefit, the 1987 Revised Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act (RMNCA) provides states the opportunity to
modify fiduciary duties as defined in the RMNCA, and specifically, permits
the practice of Board compensation.74 The RMNCA accomplishes this by
relaxing the standard applied to conflicts of interest and self-dealing as
established in Amory’s Prudent Man Rule,75 moving the Rule closer to
today’s for-profit Business Judgment rule76 applicable to for-profit
Boards.77 Yet, while allowing the practice of nonprofit BOD compensation
arguably alters the tradition of volunteerism,78 the Official Comments to the
RMNCA provide that BOD compensation must be consistent with the
fiduciary standards of due care and loyalty.79 Nevertheless, the Model Act
ushered in a new era of nonprofit governance.80
The 1987 RMNCA, its subsequent revisions, and most state statutes
further erode nonprofit BOD’s accountability to the public by failing to
account for the fiduciary duty of obedience.81 The nonprofit BOD duty of
obedience may be distinguished from the duties of care and loyalty as it
73. See Kirk & Nolan, supra note 72. Missions are the revered essence of nonprofits. Id. at
474.

74. See REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 1.02, 8.12, 8.30–8.33 (1987) (amended 2008).
The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act is an ABA-sponsored model statute for uniform
nonprofit governance that states may adopt. See id. §§ 1.01, 1.02.
75. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
76. Margaret E. McLean, Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Corporate Takeovers:
Restraints on the Use of ESOPS by Corporate Officers and Directors to Avert Hostile Takeovers,
10 PEPP. L. REV. 731, 761 (1983) (“The prudent man requirement is likened to the sound business
judgment rule applicable to directors of a corporation.”). Under both the nonprofit Best Judgment
and for-profit Business Judgment Rule, self-serving transactions and conflicts of interest may be
“permissible as long as the board” is “fully informed” and acts are not “demonstrably contrary to
the [organization’s] best interest.” See Hall, supra note 21, at 22.
77. Hall, supra note 21, at 22.
78. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
79. See REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.12 cmt. (1987) (noting Board must comply
with sections 8.30 through 8.33, which includes duty of care and loyalty in determining Board
compensation).
80. Jeremy Benjamin, Note, Reinvigorating Nonprofit Directors’ Duty of Obedience, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 1677, 1685 (2009) (“To combat the potential for, and effect of, nonprofit
governance abuse, an increasing number of states have adopted the Revised Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act.”).
81. Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers:
Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 631 (1998) (addressing duty
of care and loyalty but not mentioning duty of obedience); see also Huberfeld, supra note 62, at
703–04, 712 (discussing the fact that only a handful of courts have acknowledged the duty of
obedience, and that the RMNCA does not address the duty of obedience); Linda Sugin, Resisting
the Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance: Transforming Obedience into Fidelity, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 893, 897 (2007).
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does not emanate from the nonprofit organization as an organization; rather,
it arises from the organization’s charitable purpose or mission as described
in its articles of incorporation and bylaws.82 Commentators have suggested
that limiting enforceable fiduciary duties to only care and loyalty will not
sustain the public trust.83 This might be especially so considering the
heightened scrutiny afforded financial fiduciaries in today’s environment
and may work to empower the Board to all but ignore the nonprofit’s
charitable goals.84 Consequently, the duty of obedience’s absence directly
undermines Bacon’s admonition that the Board’s true responsibility is
obedience to the public good to secure against mismanagement and the
perversion of the public trust.85
Moreover, the duty of obedience plays a critical and different role from
the duty of care and loyalty since those duties are closely aligned with
market efficiencies.86 The duty of obedience maintains that Directors are
unbound by market forces in making strategic organizational decisions.87
Instead, the societal concerns of the organization’s founders as outlined in
the charitable mission contained in its articles of incorporation and bylaws
guide the decision making of Directors.88 For example, in Manhattan Eye,
Ear & Throat Hospital v. Spitzer, the court considered whether the sale of a
82. Douglas Y. Park, To Whom Does the Nonprofit Board of Directors Owe Fiduciary
Duties?, DYP ADVISORS (Feb. 12, 2013), www.dypadvisors.com/2012/04/16/to-whom-doesnonprofit-board-of-directors-owe-fiduciary-duties/. Directors’ fiduciary duties within nonprofits
extend to both the corporation and to the public. Huberfeld, supra note 62, at 699. However, it is
the duty of obedience that fixes the public benefit as articulated by the nonprofit’s charitable
mission. Id. The duty of obedience originated in the law of trusts, which requires the trustee to
administer trust assets according to the express wishes of both the creator and donors. See Sugin,
supra note 81, at 898. For nonprofit charities, Board members must make every decision in order
“to advance the nonprofit’s purpose” as articulated in the nonprofit’s mission. Danné L. Johnson,
Seeking Meaningful Nonprofit Reform in a Post Sarbanes-Oxley World, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 187,
200 (2009) (citation omitted). Courts analyze the duty of obedience under one of two approaches:
first, a narrow approach via an ultra vires interpretation questioning whether or not the Board
acted outside the scope of the organization’s purpose; and second, a more flexible approach via an
internal interpretation of how the Directors managed the scope of the organization’s mission. See
Sugin, supra note 81, at 900–02.
83. See Sugin, supra note 81, at 894. Some states do apply the duty of obedience even though
those states fail to codify it. Id. at 899. This is well illustrated by the recent increase in restricted
gifts resulting from “charities’ drifting from their . . . purpose or mission.” Benjamin, supra note
80, at 1677–78. Restricted gifts create a trust, and therefore, their use is even narrower than the
charitable purpose. Id. at 1680.
84. See Sugin, supra note 81, at 894; Benjamin, supra note 80, at 1679–80.
85. Compare REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (1987) (failing to discuss the duty of
obedience) with Bacon, supra note 1, at 32–33 (arguing that the BOD’s true responsibility is to
obey the public good).
86. Benjamin, supra note 80, at 1681.
87. Id. at 1682 (observing that, under the duty of obedience, “nonprofits are foremost
concerned with their mission, which they find inherently valuable and to be considered before
economics”).
88. See id.
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troubled New York nonprofit hospital violated the Board’s duty of
obedience.89 The court conceded that eliminating the nonprofit’s mission
via a dissolution of its assets and establishing a new mission might be
appropriate to solve financial difficulties;90 however, it cautioned that the
duty of obedience requires a consideration of whether “[e]mbarkation upon
a course of conduct which turns it away from the charity’s central and wellunderstood mission should be a carefully chosen option of last resort.”91
Though the nature and scope of nonprofit BOD fiduciary duties have
been at the forefront of recent discussions of nonprofit reform proposals and
financial concerns,92 the RMNCA does not impose substantial regulations
on nonprofits to ensure financial accountability.93 This starkly contrasts
with laws governing for-profit organizations, which must follow the
financial accountability requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.94
Furthermore, little concerted effort to effect regulatory change has been
proposed for nonprofits,95 while similar action can be observed in other
sectors. For example, the SEC, the President, and various industry groups
and leaders have endorsed modifying Broker-Dealer laws to include
fiduciary duties.96 Yet, in regard to nonprofits, Congress has initiated
merely two panel reports that express concerns for nonprofit governance,
fiduciary duty, and other ethical issues such as BOD compensation.97
Congress has instead relegated to the states the authority to propose
legislative reforms in these areas to strengthen fiduciary duty for nonprofit
governance.98
D. STATE AND FEDERAL REFORMS
The states exercise primary jurisdiction and regulatory authority over
nonprofits by governing their legal formation, providing oversight of their

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 593 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
Id. at 595.
Id.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
See REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (1987) (amended 2008).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, pmbl., 116 Stat. 745, 745 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 7201) (enacting Sarbanes-Oxley Act “[t]o protect investors by improving the
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures”).
95. Doug Donovan, Nonprofits Need a Strong, Unified Voice to Lobby Government, Report
Says, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY (Sept. 19, 2012), http://philanthropy.com/article/NonprofitsNeed-a-Strong/134540/.
96. See generally STAFF OF THE SEC, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKERDEALERS (2011) (recommending the implementation of, among others, duties of care and loyalty
to broker-dealers). In fact, one commentator suggests working toward a “fiduciary society,” where
those entrusted with other’s money must abide by fiduciary duties imposed by federal statute.
John Bogle, A Crisis of Ethic Proportions, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2009, at A19.
97. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
98. See infra notes 114, 69, 104, and accompanying text.
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operations, and enforcing their fiduciary duties.99 State statutes require
nonprofits to file articles of incorporation and bylaws which must include
statements of charitable purpose and mission.100 State AGs, representing the
interests of the public trust, are the public face of nonprofit accountability,
transparency, and disclosure.101 They provide oversight of nonprofit
fiduciary duty, mission, and purpose and enforce state nonprofit law.102
California spearheads State efforts to adopt Sarbanes-Oxley-like
requirements of financial integrity for nonprofit organizations103 To wit, the
California Nonprofit Integrity Act imposes on nonprofit Boards a
responsibility to exercise heightened oversight over its financial matters.104
However, while a step in the right direction, the California law has many
weaknesses. First, California hospitals are exempt from mandatory audit
and accompanying disclosure requirements.105 Also, while the California
legislation sets a standard of reasonableness for Board approval of CEO and
CFO compensation as well as Board compensation, it provides little
guidance by way of criteria to follow in applying the standard.106 Third,
while California law prohibits and penalizes nonprofit breaches of the duty
of loyalty through self-dealing, these restrictions do not apply to
compensation of Board members who participate in the decision to pay as
long as the compensation is just and reasonable.107 Finally, even though
California defines a volunteer Board member as one who is not

99. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5000–10841(2012) (governing nonprofit corporation law);
see also MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 180 §§ 1–29 (2010) (governing corporations for charitable uses).
Many states have passed “sunshine laws” that require nonprofits to disclose financial information,
including revenue and expenditures. Donnelly, supra note 7, at 164 n.8 (citation omitted).
100. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5130–5134 (2012).
101. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5250 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 12, § 8 (2010).
102. See supra note 69.
103. Donnelly, supra note 7, at 176–77 (noting that California was the first state to legislate
state-imposed reforms on nonprofit governance); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12586(e) (2005)
(requiring financial reporting and audits for nonprofits with gross revenues of $2 million or more).
104. See David Tate, Nonprofit Board Standard of Care, Risk Management, and Audit
Committee Responsibility, DAVIDTATE.US, 4 (May 19, 2011), http://davidtate.us/files
/Nonprofit_Board_Standard_of_Care_Risk_Management_and_Audit_Committee_Responsibilitie
s_David_Tate_Esq_051920113.pdf (noting that, while the entire BOD is responsible for
overseeing nonprofit’s financial statements and accounting system, the BOD may delegate that
responsibility to an audit committee and, if it receives more than $2 million in gross revenues,
must have their annual financial statements audited by an independent certified public accountant).
But cf. NYS Legislative Session, NPCCNY.ORG (Aug. 2005), http://www.npccny.org/info
/gov_rel_080105b.htm (proposing, unsuccessfully, the “Nonprofits Accountability Bill,” which
would have imposed Sarbanes-Oxley-like financial controls requirements on nonprofit BODs).
105. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12583 (2005); see also Rosemary E. Fei, California’s Nonprofit
Integrity Act of 2004, ALDER & COLVIN, 5 (Spring 2006), http://www.adlercolvin.com/pdf
/nonprofit_governance/AC%20Web%20Resource%20--%20CA%20NIA%20of%202004%20
(00171023).PDF.
106. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12586(g).
107. Blodgett & Melconian, supra note 8, at 197–219.
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compensated, it permits Director reimbursement by the nonprofit for
expenses incurred.108
In terms of nonprofit BOD compensation, Illinois, California, Texas,
and Virginia explicitly authorize modest compensation of nonprofit Boards
in their statutory codes.109 Illinois, for example, has increased the amount of
nonprofit compensation a Director can receive without losing statutory
limited liability protection from $5,000 to $25,000.110 However, none of the
statutory provisions of these four states describe standards of reasonable
compensation for Board members, and none of them provide criteria by
which to determine the overall justification for BOD compensation.111
This lack of concrete statutory guidance, and perhaps fueled by the
1987 RNMCA’s failure to align the nonprofit BOD duty of obedience with
its respective mission, has led to increased attorney general activism,112
especially with regard to nonprofit BOD compensation. The Massachusetts
AG, Martha Coakley (AG Coakley), has been front and center in attempts
to regulate Massachusetts nonprofits.113 In 2009, AG Coakley undertook a
study aimed at reviewing nonprofits’ compensation practices with regard to
independent Directors and focused specifically on the compensation
practices of four Massachusetts charitable health insurance providers.114 In
2011, perhaps at least partially in response to AG Coakley’s study, two of
the four Massachusetts health insurance providers suspended Director
compensation indefinitely,115 while the other two voted to continue the
108. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3352(i) (2010); CAL LAB. CODE § 3363.6(c) (2010);
Peregrine Testimony, supra note 6.
109. Peregrine Testimony, supra note 6.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 7 (noting the Massachusettes AG’s “vigorous oversight of the nonprofit sector”);
see also Alice M. Maples, State Attorney General Oversight of Nonprofit Healthcare
Corporations: Have We Reached an Ideological Impasse?, 37 CUMB. L. REV. 235, 240–41
(2007). Oversight by State AGs has increased over the last few years. See Patrick Coffey et al.,
The “Charitable Trust” Controversy Confronting Banner Health and Other Nonprofit Healthcare
Systems, 16 HEALTH LAW. 1, 1 (2003). The various AGs argue that nonprofit corporate assets are
held in trust for the benefit of the community that a particular nonprofit serves. Id. The competing
arguments balance a lack of resources and an otherwise lack of regulation. Maples, supra, at 240.
113. See Christine McConville, Pols Aim to Ban Money for Nonprofit Boards, BOSTON
HERALD, May 23, 2011, at 5.
114. Press Release, Mass. Att’y Gen. Office, Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley
Announces Enhanced Oversight of Non-Profit Executive and Board Compensation (Sept. 2,
2009), available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2009/ag-coakleyannounces-enhanced-oversight-of.html.
115. Massachusetts Blue Cross Blue Shield, although voting to end its practice of Director
compensation in 2011, subsequently reinstated this practice in 2013. See Robert Weisman, Blue
Cross to Pay Board Again, Though at Reduced Level, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1, 2013,
http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/03/01/blue-cross-blue-shield-massachusetts-reinstateboard-fees-though-reduced-level/SuPw27Pjg84r1bQ93GWu4M/story.html. Fallon Community
Health Plan, the other health insurer that suspended its BOD compensation, also reinstated its
Director compensation practices. Id.
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practice.116 Shortly after, AG Coakley released a critical and strongly
negative report on the compensation practices of the two health insurance
providers that elected to continue compensating their independent
Directors.117
In her report, AG Coakley noted that “Compensating [D]irectors is
contrary to [charitable] spirit and diverts resources otherwise focused on
achieving the charitable mission of the organization.”118 The report further
pointed out that an inherent conflict of interest exists with the Board’s selfdetermination of compensation.119 Ultimately, as a result of its findings, the
report submitted two Massachusetts AG initiatives: (1) public disclosure of
independent Director compensation levels, as well as the basis and rationale
for such compensation; and (2) specific legislation authorizing AGdetermination of justifiable compensation.120
In May 2011, AG Coakley filed legislation aimed at prohibiting the
continued practice of compensating independent Directors of public
charities.121 The Bill proposes that “[n]o Massachusetts based public charity
. . . shall provide compensation to any independent officer, [D]irector or
trustee for service . . . except with the approval of the Director [of the AG’s
public charities division]. . . . Any such public charity intending to provide
[such] compensation . . . shall file an application . . . requesting the
approval of the Director.”122 The Bill further permits the AG to develop
criteria for granting its approval through rules and regulations.123 The
legislation, however, remained in committee at the end of the formal 2012
legislative session and its future passage is uncertain.124
116. See Spackman Letter, supra note 24, at 1; see also Robert Weisman, Insurer’s Board
Suspends Own Pay, BOSTON.COM (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.boston.com/business/healthcare
/articles/2011/03/09/blue_cross_board_suspends_its_own_pay/.
117. See generally Spackman Letter, supra note 24 (criticizing the compensation practices of
Tufts Health Plan and Harvard Pilgrim Health Care).
118. Id. at 2.
119. Id. at 2–3.
120. Id. at 5–6.
121. Bill H. 3516, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/187/House
/H3516 (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Bill H. 3516].
122. H.B. 3516, 187th Leg. (Mass. 2011).
123. Id. § 1, sec. 8F½(b). The AG has developed regulations in which the office has established
a rebuttable presumption standard. See also HOSMER, supra note 71.
124. See H.R. 3515, 2011 Leg., 187th Sess. (Mass. 2011), available at http://www
.malegislature.gov/Bills/187/House/H3516. AG Coakley’s report and legislative proposal invited
critical comments and strong opposition. See, e.g., Attorney General Coakley’s Latest Proposal
Could Drive Foundations and Their Money Out of Massachusetts, CHARITY GOVERNANCE
CONSULTING (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.charitygovernance.com/charity_governance/2011/04
/attorney-general-coakleys-latest-proposal-could-drive-foundations-and-their-money-our-ofmassachusetts.html#more [hereinafter CHARITY GOVERNANCE CONSULTING]. For example, some
argued that the legislation is merely a political reaction to a problem that does not exist. Id.
Furthermore, the article pointed out a potential constitutional challenge under the freedom of
association. Id. Critics also noted several potential unintended results including the potential that
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In addition to state government, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) also
exercises oversight over nonprofits.125 Recent revisions in IRS Forms 990
and 1023, the forms with which all nonprofit corporations must comply to
secure their tax-exempt status,126 require more reporting transparency and
disclosures.127 The IRS proposes nine principles of good governance for
nonprofits, including Principal 8, which governs payment of reasonable
Board and executive compensation.128 Principle 8 cautions that charities
should refrain from compensating Directors, but nonetheless allows
Director compensation “when determined appropriate by a committee
composed of persons who are not compensated by the charity and have no
financial interest in the determination.”129 Principle 8 also directs readers to
various parts of the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations, but
fails to identify little additional criteria apart to those mentioned in the Code
and Regulations that are unique to Board member compensation.130
Furthermore, these nine principles include “satisfaction” requirements for
nonprofits would move out of Massachusetts and an increased number of side deals for talent
would occur as former board members became paid consultants. Id.
125. Blodgett & Melconian, supra note 8, at 197–219. This special tax-exempt status is granted
because nonprofits commit their net earnings to public purpose and benefit. See Pamela C. Smith
& Kelly A. Richmond, Call for Greater Accountability Within the U.S. Nonprofit Sector, 11
ACAD. ACCT. & FIN. STUD. J. 75, 76–77 (2007). Additionally, they must adhere to the language of
the 1969 Tax Reform Act, which provides “rigorous registration, reporting, and accountability
requirements.” See Hall, supra note 21, at 21.
126. Nicole Gilkeson, Note, For-Profit Scandal in the Nonprofit World: Should States Force
Sarbanes-Oxley Provisions onto Nonprofit Corporations?, 95 GEO. L.J. 831, 852 (2007) (stating
that Form 990 must be filed in order to preserve tax-exempt status); C. Eugene Steuerle & Martin
A. Sullivan, Toward More Simple and Effective Giving: Reforming the Tax Rules for Charitable
Contributions and Charitable Organizations, 12 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 399, 442 (1995) (stating that
Form 1023 must be filed to preserve tax-exempt status).
127. Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Releases Discussion Draft of Redesigned Form
990 for Tax-Exempt Organizations (June 14, 2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRSReleases-Discussion-Draft-of-Redesigned-Form-990-for-Tax-Exempt-Organizations. Steuerle &
Sullivan, supra note 126. But see Donnelly, supra note 7, at 180, 188 (noting that the IRS lacks
legislative authority from Congress to regulate nonprofit governance).
128. The nine principles of good governance for nonprofits proposed by the IRS are
(1) Adoption of a Mission Statement, (2) Adoption of a Code of Ethics and
Whistleblower policies, (3) Satisfaction of the Duty of Care/Director Diligence, (4)
Satisfaction of the Duty of Loyalty/effective conflicts of interest oversight, (5)
Constituent transparency, (6) Oversight of fund-raising activity, (7) Stewardship of
financial affairs, (8) Payment of reasonable compensation; and (9) Adoption of a
document retention policy.
IRS Releases Suggested Governance Guidelines for Tax-Exempt Organizations, MCDERMOTT
WILL & EMERY (Feb. 5, 2007), http://www.mwe.com/publications/uniEntity.aspx?xpST
=PublicationDetail&pub=6137; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., GOOD GOVERNANCE PRACTICES
FOR 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS [hereinafter GOOD GOVERNANCE], available at http://www
.mwe.com/info/news/IRS0207.pdf.
129. GOOD GOVERNANCE, supra note 128, at 4.
130. Id.; 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-6 (2002). But see Treas Reg. § 53.4958-6 (noting factors and
examples supporting rebuttable presumption of the reasonableness of compensation).
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evaluation of Board performance of fiduciary duties of care and loyalty; yet
they are silent on the fiduciary duty of obedience.131
Prior to the annual filing of Form 990, nonprofits must file an initial
Form 1023 in order to receive a federal tax exemption under § 501(c)(3).132
In 2004, the IRS amended Form 1023 and developed a new list of questions
as a result of its survey of perceived executive and Board abuses.133 These
questions address BOD pay and other compensation issues.134 Others have
noted that,
[w]hile the Form 1023 prior to the current version asked questions
regarding organization structure and governance, it principally focused on
the charitable activities of the organization. In contrast, the 2004 . . .
version places an increased emphasis on an organization’s governance by

131. GOOD GOVERNANCE, supra note 128, at 4.
132. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 1023 (rev. 2006) [hereinafter 2006 FORM 1023];
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 990 (2012). Treasury regulations provide that nonprofits must
make their Form 990 and Form 1023, along with the IRS determination letter readily available for
public inspection by request or by posting on the Internet. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.6104(d)-1(a),
301.6104(d)-2(a), (b)(2) (2012). However, only the IRS has standing to bring an action against the
nonprofit for failure to comply with the disclosure requirement. Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a
Private Foundation’s Governance and Self-Interested Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation,
50 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1129 n.223 (2001). Commentators have suggested that regulation should
require nonprofits to post these forms on the nonprofit’s webpage. Carter G. Bishop, The
Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate Governance Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of
Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 701, 776 (2008).
133. See Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Revises Application Form for Charitable
Organizations (Nov. 1, 2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Revises-ApplicationForm-for-Charitable-Organizations; Friz & Virgin, supra note 41, at 7.
134. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 1023, at 3 (rev. 2004) [hereinafter 2004 FORM 1023].
Part V of the revised Form 1023 asks
[1] Do you or will the individuals that approve compensation arrangements follow a
conflict of interest policy? [2] Do you or will you approve compensation arrangements
in advance of paying compensation? [3] Do you or will you document in writing the
date and terms of approved compensation arrangements? [4] Do you or will you record
in writing the decision made by each individual who decided or voted on compensation
arrangements? [5] Do you or will you approve compensation arrangements based on
information about compensation paid by similarly situated taxable or tax-exempt
organizations for similar services, current compensation surveys compiled by
independent firms, or actual written offers from similarly situated organizations? . . . .
[6] Do you or will you record in writing both the information on which you relied to
base your decision and its source? . . . . [7] [Has your organization] adopted a conflicts
of interest policy consistent with the [IRS] sample conflict of interest policy . . . ? . . . .
[8] What procedures will you follow to assure that persons who have a conflict of
interest will not have influence over you for setting their own compensation? [9] What
procedures will you follow to assure that persons who have a conflict of interest will
not have influence over you regarding business deals with themselves?
Id. at 3–4 (emphasis in original).
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focusing on [B]oard and management relationships (independence) as well
as compensation and other potential opportunities for inurement.135

This proactive shift has made it more difficult for nonprofits to submit
fraudulent responses because of the specificity of the questions.136 For
example, in order to address the BOD’s fiduciary duty as it pertains to
compensation, question 5b of Part V of the 2004 Form 1023 poses, “What
procedures will you follow to assure that persons who have a conflict of
interest will not have influence over you for setting their own
compensation?”137
In two separate reports, the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector (the Panel)—
a panel convened in 2004 at the encouragement of the Senate Finance
Committee for the purpose of preparing recommendations to Congress and
the IRS to improve the oversight and governance of charitable and
nonprofit organizations—urged nonprofit Board leadership to strengthen its
governance and ethics principles with more disclosure, accountability, and
transparency, and developed hundreds of recommendations for Congress
and the IRS to improve its laws, education efforts, and enforcement.138
Particularly, the Panel’s 2007 Report identified a number of nonprofit best
practices.139 Among the items, it included Principle 20, which states the
presumption that “Board members are generally expected to serve without
compensation,” noting that in most cases compensation may not be
appropriate.140 However, despite this general presumption, it explicitly
acknowledges that nonprofit charitable organizations may pay reasonable
Board compensation when “appropriate” to do so.141
While Principle 20 discusses a mechanism for determining reasonable
compensation and suggests that Board compensation may be consistent
with governance best practices in certain instances, it fails to identify those
instances and proposes no criteria for determining what constitutes an
appropriate justification for compensating Directors.142 Rather, Principle 20
allows for Director compensation so long as it is “reasonable and necessary

135. Evelyn Brody, Sunshine and Shadows on Charity Governance: Public Disclosure as a
Regulatory Tool, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 183, 207–08 (2012).
136. See id. at 208 (citation omitted). Further, the proactive approach permits the IRS to rely
less heavily on audit procedures. Id. (citation omitted).
137. 2004 FORM 1023, supra note 134, at 4.
138. See STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY, supra note 3, at preface, 4–8; PANEL ON THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR, PRINCIPLES FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ETHICAL PRACTICE: A GUIDE
FOR CHARITIES AND FOUNDATIONS, preface, 5 (2007) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]; About the Panel
on the Nonprofit Sector, NONPROFITPANEL.ORG, http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/about/Index.html
(last visited May 26, 2013).
139. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 138, at 8–27.
140. Id. at 19; see also Peregrine Testimony, supra note 6.
141. PRINCIPLES, supra note 138, at 19.
142. Id.; see also Peregrine Testimony, supra note 6.
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to support the performance of the organization in its exempt function.”143
Consequently, nonprofits should rely on state nonprofit corporation statutes,
expressing clear legislative intent, that authorize payment of Board
compensation without State oversight.144 These statutes leave it up to the
nonprofit Board to act in the best interests of the organization.145 Unlike forprofit Boards in which the owners, stockholders, and investors of the
organization provide oversight of Board actions, nonprofit Boards are not
subject to organizational stakeholder oversight of Board decisions to
compensate themselves.146 Thus, only the State AGs, who represent the
public interest, have oversight, albeit limited, to police nonprofit Board
actions.
II. ANALYSIS
A. NONPROFIT DIRECTOR COMPENSATION MAY BE UNETHICAL
AND MAY VIOLATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Nonprofit BOD compensation raises issues of conflict of interest and
may compromise the fiduciary duties of due care, loyalty, and obedience.147
State AGs supervise nonprofit Boards’ management and may bring
enforcement actions for breaches of fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.148
For healthcare nonprofits especially, the Board must be loyal to the
nonprofit and obedient to the healthcare’s mission to finance and deliver
healthcare services.149 Directors can satisfy the duty of loyalty to advance
the best interests of the organization by avoiding conflicts of interest and
self-dealing.150 Moreover, they can meet their fiduciary duty of obedience
by advancing and fulfilling the nonprofit’s mission within the scope of the
organization’s public purpose—not by responding to competitive market
pressures—as developed in Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital.151
These duties encompass the preservation of a “great voluntary society”
benefitting the public good.152
However, autonomous Board compensation promotes, at the very least,
the appearance of a conflict of interest and provides a Board the opportunity
to advance its own self interests to the detriment of the nonprofit’s
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

PRINCIPLES, supra note 138, at 19.
Peregrine Testimony, supra note 6, at 2–3 (discussing Illinois and California law).
Id.
Id.
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See Huberfeld, supra note 62, at 701–04.
See id. at 701–02.
Id. at 703–04, 706–08; see also Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715
N.Y.S.2d 575, 597 (Sup. Ct.1999).
152. See Bacon, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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mission.153 “[D]irectors of a large charity may be more likely to consider
the advantages to themselves of doing business with the charity than to
view self-dealing transactions as a way to help the charity.”154 Self-interest
violates the Baconian ethical requirement to obey the charitable mission and
fulfill the public benefit, which in turn compromises the public trust.155
Furthermore, Board compensation without obedience to its mission
weakens the purpose of the nonprofit’s existence.156 A Board that engages
in Board compensation may not be acting within the highest moral and
ethical standards even though it meets legal standards of reasonableness and
the appropriate level of due care.157 Consequently, this permissive practice
undermines, as Bacon pointed out, the ethical “security against
mismanagement and [promotes] the gradual perversion of the trust. . . .
Great perversions of trusts . . . occur . . . for the most part unconsciously,
gradually, and with the best intentions.”158
Today’s relaxation of nonprofit fiduciary standards appears to pull
nonprofit Boards in two opposing directions: (1) meeting lofty public
expectations tied to Bacon’s historical high moral standards and
perceptions; and (2) being legally required to meet only a Best Judgment
Rule, a fiduciary standard that is analogous to the for-profit standard of
business judgment.159 This modified standard does not secure against
mismanagement; it fails to prevent self-dealing and conflicts of interest. It
creates the slippery slope Bacon warned would lead to a perversion of the
public trust. Tightening nonprofit fiduciary duty to an outright prohibition
of any self-dealing or conflicts of interest would help to differentiate it from
the for-profit Business Judgment Rule and restore the more rigorous
standards of the past.160

153. See Spackman Letter, supra note 24, at 2–3.
154. Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and
Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 637 (1999).
155. See Bacon, supra note 1, at 32–33.
156. See Kirk & Nolan, supra note 72.
157. See Bacon, supra note 1, at 32–33; REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (1987); Kirk &
Nolan, supra note 72, at 473–90.
158. Bacon, supra note 1, at 32–33; see also PRINCIPLES, supra note 138, at 19.
159. Benjamin, supra note 80, at 1694 (discussing the similarities between the for-profit and
nonprofit best judgment rule); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 n.10 (Del. 1981)
(describing the modern for-profit “business judgment” rule).
160. See Benjamin, supra note 80, at 1694; Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 784 n.10; REV. MODEL
NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. (1987) (amended 2008). The 1987 RMNCA abandoned the
strict trust standard of the “prudent man” for the more flexible and lenient corporate standard of
“business judgment.” REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. Under the trust standard,
board self-dealing and conflicts of interest are “strictly prohibited”; under the corporate standard,
such Director transactions are “permissible as long as the board [is] fully informed” and the
members are not “demonstrably contrary to the nonprofit’s best interest[s].” Hall, supra note 21,
at 22.

464

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 7

Perhaps the Massachusetts AG Final Report to the public discussed in
Part I-D reflects Bacon’s moral admonition to nonprofit Boards to avoid
perversion of the public trust.161 It’s finding that Director compensation at
the nonprofits under investigation “fail[ed] to meet the standard of good
governance that [the Massachusetts AG’s office] believe[d] should be
expected of a public charity” while still permitting nonprofits to
compensate Directors if they have a “clear and convincing rationale” for
doing so certainly corroborates the observation that the permissive practice
of Board compensation may adhere to Directors’ fiduciary duties under
limited circumstances.162 However, it further suggests that BOD
compensation may exacerbate the ethical tension that pulls nonprofit
Boards in opposing directions. The recent legislative proposal submitted by
the Massachusetts AG partially addresses such ethical tension.163 It grants
authority to the Massachusetts AG to determine the merits of Board
compensation under a “clear and convincing” standard.164 However, it does
not provide specific criteria to determine justifiable compensation.165
Any proposal to determine nonprofit Board compensation should
consider adherence to the charitable mission as the litmus test for today’s
nonprofit regulatory reforms. Ethical traditions of rigorous individual Board
responsibility, volunteerism, and adherence to mission serve the public and
the fiduciary duties of due care, loyalty, and obedience.166 As such, those
duties may preclude BOD compensation if the practice of BOD
compensation subverts its commitment to its charitable mission or
otherwise results from a conflict of interest.
An inherent conflict of interest exists when a Board determines its own
compensation.167 In the for-profit context, transparency and disclosure
reduce the conflict because shareholders react by replacing Board members,
filing derivative lawsuits, or developing shareholder proposals.168 For
example, dissatisfied shareholders may propose that Directors be
compensated with stock options in lieu of other monetary compensation in
order to align otherwise divergent interests.169 Further, the marketplace
reacts to for-profit Board decisions, thereby serving as a “backbone” to such

161. Spackman Letter, supra note 24; see Bacon, supra note 1, at 32.
162. Spackman Letter, supra note 24, at 5, 6; see also REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT
§ 8.12 (1987) (allowing Director compensation).
163. See H.R. 3515, 2011 Leg., 187th Sess. (Mass. 2011), available at http://www
.malegislature.gov/Bills/187/House/H3516.
164. See id.
165. Compare id. with 2004 FORM 1023, supra note 134.
166. See supra notes 62 and 68 and accompanying text.
167. Johansmeyer, supra note 55.
168. Id. (noting a derivative lawsuit by Goldman Sachs shareholders for excessive board
compensation).
169. Id.
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decisions. On the other hand, as discussed above in Part I.C, state regulation
has failed to expand standing beyond the AGs’ Office so that, in most
instances, donors are not able to regulate nonprofits.170 Considering this
diminished stakeholder oversight in the nonprofit context, and after
applying the fiduciary duties of due care and loyalty, Board-determined
BOD compensation may not be justifiable. The practice of permitting
Director compensation may also violate the fiduciary duty of obedience to
advance the nonprofit mission.171
B. BOARD COMPENSATION: BLURRING OF FOR-PROFIT AND
NONPROFIT HEALTHCARE SECTORS
The practice of compensating nonprofit Boards may be unethical and
potentially violative of fiduciary duties, but it also appears to be
impractical.172 This can be seen through analyzing the critiques levied
against AG Coakley’s proposed legislation discussed above in Part I-D. In
addition to the critics’ legal challenges and claims of unintended results,
critics also asserted familiar free market concerns.173 They noted that
healthcare is an evolving and highly regulated industry requiring highly
skilled and compensated Directors.174 They further contended that
competition with public companies for qualified Board members compels
healthcare nonprofits to actively compete for Directors, thereby permitting
the market to drive compensation levels.175 Finally, they claimed that
Directors’ exorbitant time commitments justify compensation.176 However,
all of these arguments resonate with for-profit rationales for compensation
rather than with nonprofit volunteerism and mission.
AG Coakley responded to these criticisms by noting that there are
equally complex charitable hospitals that do not pay their Boards.177

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See supra notes 69 and 70; see also Gilkeson, supra note 127, at 852–53.
Gilkeson, supra note 127, at 853; see also Bacon, supra note 1, at 32–33.
See supra note 124.
See CHARITY GOVERNANCE CONSULTING, supra note 124.
See Jeffrey A. Alexander & Shoou-Yih D. Lee, Does Governance Matter? Board
Configuration and Performance in Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 84 MILBANK Q. 733, 749 (2006);
Commentary for Nonprofit Health Care Board Members: The Right Path or a Minefield, 49
INQUIRY 9, 10 (2012) [hereinafter Commentary] (commentary by Bill Kreykes).
175. See Alexander & Lee, supra note 174; Commentary, supra note 174.
176. See Alexander & Lee, supra note 174; Commentary, supra note 174; see also Peregrine
Testimony, supra note 6. But see Best Practices: Nonprofit Corporate Governance, MCDERMOTT,
WILL & EMORY (June 2004), http://www.mwe.com/publications/uniEntity.aspx?xpST
=PublicationDetail&pub=4545 (providing Best Practices guideline for Nonprofit Corporate
Governance but failing to mention Director compensation).
177. See supra note 118 and accompanying text; Enabling Massachusetts Attorney General
Martha Coakley’s and Senator Mark Montigny’s Efforts to Dictate to Private Nonprofit Entities,
CHARITY GOVERNANCE CONSULTING (May 25, 2011), http://www.charitygovernance.com
/charity_governance/2011/05/enabling-massachusetts-attorney-general-martha-coakleys-and-
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Furthermore, the Massachusetts AG’s Office noted that there was no
evidence that those Boards do not volunteer a proportionate amount of
time.178 The data in Appendix A below reveals an additional and perhaps
more nuanced consideration.179 For-profit healthcare organizations do not
appear to be in direct competition with their nonprofit counterparts for
Board members because of the dramatic difference in compensation
levels.180 More importantly, compensation levels, or lack thereof, should not
form the basis of competition for qualified Board members in a nonprofit
setting.
Director compensation and competitive market forces would suggest
that Directors choose to serve based upon the level of compensation. A
brief review of the data, however, suggests otherwise.181 Appendix A
illustrates that nonprofit healthcare Board members are compensated an
average of $14,287.25 annually, while for-profit Board members within the
same industry are compensated an average of $259,556.31 annually.182 This
disparity in compensation demonstrates that Board service between a
nonprofit healthcare Board and a for-profit healthcare Board is not in direct
competition; thus, the rationale for increasing compensation as a means of
securing qualified Board members has little merit.183
Free market proponents would argue that nonprofit healthcare Director
compensation is necessary to attract better-qualified Directors.184 Similar to
the duty of obedience as described in Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat
Hospital, better quality healthcare also appears to be immune to competitive
market pressures.185 For example, several studies reveal that nonprofit
health providers offer more effective care as compared to for-profit
providers.186 Obedience to the charitable mission of the nonprofit should
drive Directors’ decision making, not profit maximization.187 Further,
enticing Directors with compensation as the driving force may result in a
senator-mark-montignys-efforts-to-dictat.html [hereinafter CHARITY GOVERNANCE CONSULTING
2].
178. See Spackman Letter, supra note 24, at 3.
179. See Appendix A: Healthcare nonprofit board compensation.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See id.; see also text accompanying notes 65–67. Those in the nonprofit healthcare
industry are willing to receive lower wages than their for-profit counterparts in exchange for job
satisfaction. See Amy Butler, Wages in the Nonprofit Sector: Healthcare, Personal Care, and
Social Service Occupations, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Apr. 15, 2009), http://bls.gov
/opub/cwc/cm20090123ar01p1.htm.
183. See Appendix A: Healthcare nonprofit and healthcare for profit board.
184. See CHARITY GOVERNANCE CONSULTING 2, supra note 177.
185. See generally Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct.
1999) (discussing the duty of obedience and its effect on a healthcare nonprofit); Woolhander &
Himmelstein, supra note 65, at 445–46.
186. Rosenau, supra note 65, at 228.
187. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.

2013]

Evolving Corporate Governance Standards

467

profit-oriented mindset contrary to the nonprofit’s charitable mission and a
volunteer society.188
C. RECOMMENDED REGULATORY APPROACH: PERFORMANCE AND
MISSION
Compensating nonprofit healthcare Directors may violate long-held
nonprofit fiduciary principles and blur distinctions between nonprofit and
for-profit governance.189 As a general practice, therefore, the nonprofit
healthcare industry should avoid compensating Directors. Instead, nonprofit
healthcare organizations should consider enhancing and promoting other
rationales or benefits that motivate individuals to serve on nonprofit Boards.
After nearly twenty-five years of the permissive practice of Board
compensation, only 2 percent of nonprofit Board members receive annual
compensation.190 This minimal participation further suggests that nonprofit
Board service is not driven by compensation. Clearly, then, it is still the
charitable mission of the nonprofit that attracts the service of Board
volunteers.191 One way to attract Directors in the absence of compensation
is to draft a comprehensive organizational mission that incorporates
branding of organizational purpose and promotes community prestige.192
Nonprofits could further promote their respective Directors and place them
in positions of high visibility. This would make BOD membership a highly
coveted and privileged experience.193 Such branding and prestige enhances
organizational mission and avoids conflicts of interest that arise when
Directors are compensated.194
This recommendation, however, is undermined as a “best practice”
when nonprofits elect to compensate their Boards.195 As previously noted,
there is a vacuum of accountability within the traditional nonprofit fiduciary
relationship because nonprofits do not have shareholders to enforce
fiduciary principles.196 The dynamic of this lack of agency control begs the
question: what is the proper regulatory approach to address nonprofit Board
compensation in the healthcare industry?
The federal government has made some progress in establishing
benchmarks and addressing the myriad of governance abuses within the
188. Kirk & Nolan, supra note 72, at 473–90; Woolhander & Himmelstein, supra note 65, at
444 (1999).
189. Johnson, supra note 82, at 195–96.
190. Id. at 205.
191. See id. at 230–31.
192. Id.
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. See supra notes 116–118 and accompanying text. Two Massachusetts nonprofits elected to
compensate their Boards despite AG Coakley’s recommendation. Id.
196. See Gilkeson, supra note 127, at 840–41.
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nonprofit sector.197 For example, both Form 990 and Form 1023 have
included disclosure requirements for organizations to receive tax-exempt
status.198 However, Form 1023 is deficient because it does not elicit specific
responses regarding substance and procedure to the majority of its
questions.199 For example, nearly every question on the Form 1023 queries
a “yes” or “no” answer.200 Question 4(d) in the section related to Director
compensation illustrates this point: “Do you or will you record in writing
the decision made by each individual who decided or voted on
compensation arrangements?”201 This lack of qualitative data is not
sufficient to ferret out improper Board compensation.202
The enforcement of fiduciary principles of nonprofit governance is left
to the respective State AGs.203 Moreover, state legislatures should follow
Massachusetts and enact legislation that establishes a rebuttable
presumption that Board compensation204 is improper and grants to the AG
rule-making authority to develop rigid criteria for overcoming that
presumption. Such proactive state legislative response, closely mirroring
the proposed Massachusetts legislation, may add sufficient rigor into Form
1023 and Principle 20 of the 2007 Panel on the Nonprofit Sector’s
Report.205
Criteria for overcoming the presumption must focus on the mission in
relation to Director performance.206 This would directly connect Board
compensation to its performance in the advancement and fulfillment of the
nonprofit’s purpose. Further, the level of concern regarding nonprofit Board
independence should be different from the for-profit healthcare industry.
Independence in the for-profit sector from meeting financial benchmarks
for compensation could be problematic because management and Directors
could manipulate earnings, whereas adhering to the nonprofit’s mission
does not lend itself to such manipulation. For example, instead of
permitting nonprofits to compensate Directors on an annual basis at a fixed
sum, the AG regulations could require nonprofits to present their mission
along with a metric for achieving that mission. Any permissible Director
compensation should be directly conditioned upon successfully satisfying
the metric, thereby properly aligning compensation with the nonprofit’s
charitable mission.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Compare 2004 FORM 1023, supra note 134, with 2006 FORM 1023, supra note 131.
Gilkeson, supra note 127, at 852 (noting donors monitor nonprofit finances via Form 990).
See generally 2006 FORM 1023, supra note 127.
Id.
Id. at 4.
See generally id.
See, e.g., supra note 69.
See H.B. 3516, 187th Leg. § 1, sec. 8F½(b) (Mass. 2011).
See id.
Kirk & Nolan, supra note 72, at 473–90.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has traced the ethical and legal history of nonprofit
governance in the United States, demonstrating a strong ethical foundation
for what should be today’s measure of nonprofit fiduciary duty. The
nonprofit Best Judgment Rule is merely analogous to the for-profit
Business Judgment Rule, thereby allowing virtually no ethical
differentiation between nonprofit and for-profit governance. In adopting the
1987 RMNCA Best Judgment Rule, state statutes have failed to alleviate
this blurring of nonprofit and for-profit fiduciary duty; rather, they have
contributed to it.
Today, nonprofit healthcare organizations, as revealed in the data
contained in Appendix A, compensate their Boards to attract talent, albeit
on a smaller scale compared to their for-profit counterparts. The current
permissive practice of Board compensation in the nonprofit healthcare
industry may be a violation of this duty. Further, justifications for nonprofit
BOD compensation that rely on the competitive landscape for Directors
mistakenly analogize nonprofit with for-profit competitive pressures for
Directorship. This Article concludes by suggesting that nonprofit Board
compensation should be presumptively prohibited and should only be
rebutted with a rigorous showing, as determined by the State AG, of how
such compensation is consistent with Director performance in achieving the
charitable mission and purpose of the nonprofit organization.
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APPENDIX A

ALL INDUSTRY DATA:
2010 Director Compensation: Top 10 All Industry Nonprofits

Education
Massachusetts Institute
of
Technology
(MA)
President
and Fellows
of Harvard
College
(MA)
Stanford
University
Board of
Trustees of
the Leland
Stanford Ju
(CA)
Trustees of
Columbia
University
in the City
of New
York (NY)
Trustees of
Princeton
University
(NJ)
Yale
University
(CT)

# of
Directors

Directors
Paid

Sum of
Salary

126

1

$789,000.00

8

0

5

Average of
Salary

Average
Hours per
Week

Max Salary

Min
Salary

$6,261.90

$789,000.00

$

4.23

$

$

$

$

5.00

0

$

$

$

$

5.00

31

0

$

$

$

$

2.00

24

1

$789,000.00

$32,875.00

$789,000.00

$

3.00

40

0

$

$

$

$

6.23

18

0

$

$

$

$

4.72

$

2.66

$2,598,345.
Health
Howard
Hughes
Medical
Institute
(MD)
Kaiser
Foundation
Health Plan
Inc. (CA)
Kaiser
Foundation
Hospitals
(CA)

34

22

00

$76,421.91

$232,123.00

10

10

$439,582.00

$ 43,958.20

$60,000.00

12

12

00

$179,896.92

$232,123.00

65.00

2.43

12

0

$

$

$

$

2.43

$30,83

$2,158,763.

2.00

3.20

$122,8

2013]
Economic
Development
Southwest
Louisiana
Business
Development Center
(LA)
Grand
Total
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0

0

$

$

$

$

0.00

0

0

$

$

$

$

0.00

160

23

$21,039.41

$789,000.00

$

3.87

$3,387,345.
00

Note. Kaiser Hospitals and Kaiser Health Plan have the same board
members; only show compensation for Kaiser Health Plan on Form 990.
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2010 Director Compensation: Top 10 All Industry For-Profits
# of
Directors

Directors
Paid

Sum of Salary

Average of
Salary

Max of
Salary

Min of
Salary

55

55

$15,061,610.00

$273,847.45

$646,229.00

12

12

$3,693,762.00

$307,813.50

$646,229.00

$18,750.00
$240,000.0
0

Citigroup
JPMorgan
Chase

17

17

$4,232,500.00

$248,970.59

$612,500.00

10

10

$2,555,185.00

$255,518.50

$270,185.00

Wells Fargo
Conglomer
ates
General
Electric
Diversified
Financials

16

16

$4,580,163.00

$286,260.19

$377,217.00

16

16

$4,741,353.00

$296,334.56

$357,251.00

16

16

$4,741,353.00

$296,334.56

$357,251.00

40

40

$10,907,347.00

$272,683.68

$503,287.00

9

9

$1,685,000.00

$187,222.22

$300,000.00

$34,348.00
$160,000.0
0

11

11

$1,791,348.00

$162,849.82

$300,000.00

$34,348.00

11

11

$4,627,249.00

$420,659.00

$503,287.00

9

9

$2,803,750.00

$311,527.78

$322,917.00

$199,335.0
0
$299,583.0
0

13

13

$3,071,659.00

$236,281.46

$521,220.00

$23,750.00

13

13

$3,071,659.00

$236,281.46

$521,220.00

$23,750.00

124

124

$33,781,969.00

$272,435.23

$646,229.00

$18,750.00

Banking
Bank of
America

Fannie Mae
Freddie
Mac
Goldman
Sachs
Group
Morgan
Stanley
Insurance
American
Intl Group
Grand
Total

$18,750.00
$245,000.0
0
$41,000.00
$151,650.0
0
$151,650.0
0
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Healthcare Data:
2010 Director Compensation: Top 10 Healthcare Nonprofits

Adventist
Health
System
Sunbelt
Inc (FL)
Banner
Health
(AZ)
Catholic
Healthcar
e West
(AZ)
Cleveland
Clinic
Foundation (OH)
Howard
Hughes
Medical
Institute
(MD)
Kaiser
Foundation Health
Plan Inc
(CA)
Kaiser
Foundation
Hospitals
(CA)
Memorial
SloanKettering
Cancer
Center
(NY)
Shriners
Hospitals
for
Children
(FL)
Trinity
Health
Corporation (MI)
Grand
Total

Avera
ge
Hours
per
week

# of
Directors

Directors
Paid

22

1

$3,091.00

$140.50

$3,091.00

$

2.77

12

2

$432,000.00

$36,000.00

$45,000.00

$27,000.
00

4.00

15

1

$43,804.00

$2,920.27

$43,804.00

$

3.53

$

$

$

$

2.80

92

Sum of
Salary

Average of
Salary

Max
Salary

Min
Salary

10

1

$439,582.00

$43,958.20

$60,000.00

$30,832.
00

3.20

12

2

$2,158,763.0
0

$179,896.92

$232,123.0
0

$122,865
.00

2.43

12

0

$

$

$

$

2.43

31

0

$

$

$

$

1.42

12

1

$111,540.00

$9,295.00

$111,540.0
0

$

6.25

11

4

$7,545.45

$

2.00

229

41

$83,000.00
$3,271,780.0
0

$

2.84

$14,287.25

$25,000.00
$232,123.0
0

Note. Kaiser Hospitals and Kaiser Health Plan have the same board
members; only show compensation for Kaiser Health Plan on Form 990.

474

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 7

2010 Director Compensation: Top 10 Health For-profits
# of
Directors

Directors
Paid

12

12

13

Average of
Salary

Max of
Salary

$2,552,377.00

$212,698.08

$227,228.00

Min of
Salary
$203,228.0
0

13

$2,847,982.00

$219,075.54

$241,920.00

$91,942.00

13

13

$2,985,182.00

$229,629.38

Cigna
Community
Health
Systems
Express
Scripts

11

11

$4,959,691.00

$450,881.00

$633,650.00
$2,398,849.0
0

$27,382.00
$240,208.0
0

7

7

$1,375,042.00

$196,434.57

$235,007.00

11

11

$2,833,000.00

$257,545.45

$277,000.00

Humana

10

10

$2,793,982.00

$279,398.20

$562,340.00

Medco Health

8

8

$2,213,312.00

$276,664.00

$297,789.00

Stryker

8

8

$2,228,293.00

$278,536.63

$308,721.00

$20,000.00
$244,000.0
0
$212,516.0
0
$257,789.0
0
$222,246.0
0

Thermo Fisher

12

12

$2,464,552.00

$205,379.33

Grand Total

105

105

$27,253,413.00

$259,556.31

$385,023.00
$2,398,849.0
0

Baxter
International
Becton,
Dickinson
Boston
Scientific

Sum of Salary

$4,889.00
$4,889.00

